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Fault Simulation 
using . 
:Binary Decision Diagrams 
Abstract 
··This paper describes an algorithm fo·r performing fault 
-s-imulation on binary decision diagrams with a 
,computational bomplexity similar to that of good fault 
simulation algorithms for gate networks. The algorithm 
a.an use fault dropping and can handle multiple observable 
outputs in a single pass, so that substantial reductions 
in simulation are obtained, as was confirmed in. tra·i·l run·s 
of a limited number of test cases. 
:~. 
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Fault Simulation 
·using 
Binary Decision Diagrams 
1 Introduction 
i~l BDD Definitions 
;. 
A binary decis·ion diagram, or BDD, is a type of 
:a.cyclic directed graph that can be used to determine the 
value of a boolean function [l]. The graph is constructed 
from nodes and edges. Constant nodes have an out degree of 
o~ All other nodes have an out degree of exactly 2 and 
:contain the name of a variable. I will call these nodes 
variable nodes.or decision nodes to distinguish them from 
constant nodes. The outward edges are called the exits of 
the node. In particular, one edge is called the a-exit 
and the other • 1S called the 1-exit. Unless otherwise 
labelled, the left edge is the a-exit. Exactly one . node 
2 
\ 
' 
' 
}. 
in a BOD has an in degree of o. This node is called the 
entrance node or.root of the BOD. To determine the value 
of the function represented by a BDD for a given input, 
·start at the entrance node and work downward through the_ 
nodes. If the node is a constant node, the value of tht 
function is the value of that node. Otherwise, take the 
r 
a-exit if the value of the node's variable is false or the 
1-exit if it is true. Figure 1 s~ows a BDD with its parts 
labelled. The numbers in parentheses are node numbers 
that correspond to numbers in a later example. 
F!gure 1. A BDD 
-----(1) I A I <--- entrance node 
-----
I Q:-.. ~xit ---> / 
-----
(2) I B I 
-----~· 
I \ 
1-· \ 
(.3:)- Q: ( 4) 
l_-.·2: -BDD Data Structures 
\ 
, I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
<--- 1-exit 
<-... _~-- constant node 
The input to the BDD fault simulation algorithm I 1S a 
set of BDD's. We will call each diagram in the set of 
BDD's a graph and the entire set of graphs a network to 
3 
.. 
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avoid confusion between a single diagram ~nd the entire 
set of diagrams. The· BDD fault simulation algorithm 
requires two types of data structures: graphs and nodes. 
·Each graph contains a graph descriptor, a pointer to a 
l 
node, and a graph value. Each node contains a left node 
(O-exit) pointer, a right node (1-exit) pointer, a 
variable pointer, and a node value. There are two types 
of graphs: input graphs and output graphs. Each input 
graph corresponds to a primary input to the network. The 
value of an input graph is theturrent value of the input 
it represents. Each output graph cqrresponds to a BDD and 
has a pointer to the entry node of the BOD. The value of 
a BDD is the same as the value of its entry node. 
There are two types of nodes: constant nodes and 
variable nodes. Constant nodes have a fixed value of 
either o or 1. The value of a variable node depends on 
the value of the graph that represents its variable and on 
the values of the nodes at its exits. If the value of the 
graph is o, then the value of the node is the value of the 
•. 
node pointed to by the node's left pointer; otherwise, the 
value of the node is the value pointed to by the node's 
right pointer. The data structure for the BOD from the 
previous example is shown with comments in Figure 2. The 
node values correspond to an input with A set to O and B 
set to 1. 
4 
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Fi·gure 2. Data structures for a BOD 
Graph Descriptor Value Node Poi
nter Comments 
----- -------
---
-----
------
------
-------
-
1 input 0 -
variable A 
2 input l -
variable B 
3 output 0 l 
entrance 
of a BDD 
Node o-exit 1-exit Variable Valu
e Comments 
---- -
----- -
-----
-------
- ----
- ---
-----
1 2 4 l 
0 entrance node 
depends on A 
2 3 4 2 
l depends on B 
3 ·-· - (, 0 
0 constant 0 
4 1 
·1 constant 1 
-
-
When a ~DD is excited with an input, e
ither the left 
or the right branch of each node is 
activated. Among the 
set of activated branches, there is a 
unique path from the 
·, 
entrance node of the BDD to exactly o
ne of its exit nodes. 
The path is called the active path fo
r that input. 
It is possible to simulate a BDD netw
ork by simulating 
every node from the constant node
s to the root node in 
much the·same manner that gate networ
ks must be simulated 
gate by gate. However, since the
 value of a BDD only 
depends on the value of the constant n
ode at the end of 
the active path, it is much more 
efficient to simulate 
only the active path by starting at th
e entrance node and 
working towards the exit node. 
Note that whenever a 
decision node depends on the value o
f an output graph, 
that graph must be evaluated before m
aking the decision on 
5 
v, 
' ' 
the node. 
1.3 Pseudo-Code Notation 
... 
We will describe our gate conversion 
,. 
algorithm and 
several versions of our fault simulation algorithm in a 
Pascal-like pseudo-code. Each procedure will be declared 
as 
procedure example(exampleargument); 
begin 
do something 
end; 
Comments will be delimited by braces, for example 
,, 
{ this is a sample comment}. 
IF statements have the syntax 
if some condition then 
do action Al 
do action A2 
else 
do action Bl 
do action B2 
while FOR statements have the syntax 
for each item in a set do 
do something with the item 
Note that.IF and FOR statements can be nested inside each 
other and that statements in the body of another statement 
are marked by their indentation. As in Pascal, we will 
. 
use square brackets to denote array subscripts and periods 
(".") to reference elements 
6 
in . structures.· The 
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( 
declarations of the variables that we will use in 
pseudo-code to represent BOD networks are shown in Figure 
3. For example, Nodes is a data structure that represents 
all the nodes in a BOD network; Nodes[5] represents node 
number 5, and Nodes[5].LeftNode represents a pointer to 
the a-exit of node number 5. 
Figure 3. Declarations 
Nodes: array [1 .• MaximumNumberOfNodes] of 
record 
Value { value of this node, 
o, 1, or unknown} 
.. 
Critical { whether this node is critical, 
Yes, No, Unknown} 
Graph { pointer to the graph that 
contains this node} 
DecisionGraph { pointer to the graph that 
represents the nodes•s 
variable} 
LeftNode { pointer to the o exit 
of this node} 
RightNode { pointer to the 1 exit 
of this node} 
end; 
Graphs: array [1 .. MaximumNumberOfGraphs] of 
record 
GraphType { InputGraph, outputGraph, or 
ObservableOutputGraph} 
Value { value of this graphs, 
o, 1, or unknown} 
Critical { whether this graph is critical, 
Yes, No, Unknown} 
EntranceNode { pointer to entrance node of 
this graph} 
end; 
.• 
:• 
. :~·· 
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2 Conversion of Gate Networks to BDD's 
• 
:~:.:1 Goals of the Conversion Algorithm 
When doing fault an~lysis on gate networks, the 
stuck-at fault model is typically used. In this model, a 
fault c~uses a line to be stuck at either o or 1. A 
fanout branch can be stuck without having its stem or 
other branches stuck. So that we may do fault simulation 
on a BDD network, we must be able to convert the gate 
networks into BDD networks in such a manner that faults in 
the original gate network can be mapped into faults in the 
BDD network. To be completely general, the • conversion 
algorithm must also be able to handle any combinational 
circuit, including circuits with multiple outputs. 
In order to maintain the correspondence between 
. 
faults, BDD networks are created in an algorithmic fashion 
such that each BDD node corresponds to an input lead • in 
the gate network and each graph corresponds to a primary 
input, fanout stem or observable output. In the BDD, gate 
inputs are represented by nodes, and the value of each 
input is represented by the value of the graph 
8 
• 
. -. 
corresponding to the.node's variable. Thus, stuck-at-a or 
1 faults in a gate network correspond to stuck-left or 
4 
right faults in a·node. This was first described in [9]. 
2:. 2 The Conversion Algorithm 
The process of BOD construction starts by creating an 
input graph for each primary input in the gate network. 
Then, the gates in the gate network are examined in order 
by increasing level. For each gate, if the first input is 
a primary input, a fanout stem, or an observable output, 
then a decision node is created with the graph: 
corresponding to that line as the decision variable. The· 
new node is labelled with the line number of the input. 
Otherwise, the input must be the output of a gate with a 
fanout of exactly 1. Since the gates are processed by 
increasing level, a BDD was already created for this gate 
in an earlier step. 
I 
This BDD will now be used to 
represent the input line of the current gate. The same is 
done for all the other inputs. If the gate is an OR gate 
or a NOR gate, the new input is combined with the existing 
BDD by replacing all o exits of the existing BDD with the 
entrance node of the BDD for the new input. If the gate 
is an AND ·gate or a NANO gate, the new input is combined 
.9 
-; 
by·replacing all l exits of the eiisting BDD with the 
entrance node of the BDD for the new input. After all the 
inputs are processed, if the gate is an INVERTER, ' a NOR 
gate or a NAND gate, all the o and 1 constant nodes of the 
BOD are complemented. If the gate output is a fanout stem 
or an observable line, a graph entry is made for it. An 
.... 
example of a gate network is shown in Figure the resulting 
BOD network is shown in Figure 5, and its data structure 
is shown in Figure 6. The values of the nodes in the data 
structure correspond to an input of o for A and 1 for B. 
A more precise statement of the algorithm follows in 
Figure 7. Note that in the statement of the algorithm, we 
treat primary inputs as a type of gate just as we treat 
them as a type of graph in BOD networks. 
Figure 4. A Gate Network 
a.O d.l ------A---------------------------1 I d.O I INANDl------
1 C. 1 ------ ------1 I I ------
------1 I C. 0 I d. 2 ------ ------1 I 
INANDI------ INANDI------F 
------1 I I e.1 ------ ------1 I 
I C. 2 ------ ------1 I I ------
1 INANDI------B----~----------------------1 I e.o 
b.O e.2 ------
~ .. 
10 
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Figure 5. Resulting Binary Decision Diagrams 
BDD 1 
I 
A 
(9) 
BDD 2 BOD 3 
I I 
B 
------(3) IBDDll 
1a.o I 
------
I 
(1) 0 (2) 
BDD 6 
I 
------
(7) I BDD3 I 
Id. 1 I 
------
I \ 
I ------
I ( 8) I BDD5 I 
I Id. 2 I 
I ------
I I \ 
------
IBDD5I 
1e.1 I 
--=-----
\ 
------
(10) IBDD61 
1e.2 I 
------
I 
1 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
0 
BDD 4 BDD 5 
I I 
------ ------
(4) IBDD21 (5) IBDD3I 
lb.O I 1c.1 I 
------ ------
I \ I \ 
1 0 1 I ------
I ( 6) I BDD4 I 
I I c. 2 I 
I -------
I I \ 
1 
I 1-
, 
I _/ / 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
11 
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Figure 6. Resulting Data Structure 
' 
Graph Descriptor Value Node Pointer Comment 
-----
----------
-----
------------
-------
1 input 0 - variable A 
2 input 1 - variable B 
3 output :o 3 A 
l 4 output ·1 .4. B 
5 output ·1 5 output of gate C .. 
6 obs. output 1 7 output of network 
Node a-exit 1-exit Variable Graph Value Comment 
---- ------ ------
--------
----- ----- -------
1 - - 0 - 0 constant 0 
~ - - 1 - 1 constant 1 
3 1. 2 1 3 0 A 
4 l 2 2 4 1 B 
5 2 6 3 5: .1 C.1 
6 2 1 4 5· 0 C.2 
7 9 8.: 3 6: 1 D.1 
8 9 2 5 6; 1 D.2 
9 1 l·O. 5 6· 1 E.1 
10·. 1 : ..~: 4 6: 1 E.2 
·, 
·,i 
,,., .. 
• 
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Figure 7. Conversion Algorithm 
for each primary, input do 
create an input graph 
for each gate in order of increasing level do 
if it is a primary input then 
create a node with the input as the decision point 
label the node with the line number of the input 
else if the gate is an inverter ~hen · 
if' its input is represented by a graph then 
create a node with the graph as the decision point 
label the node with the line number 
. of the inverter's input 
else 
take the partial BDD for the input 
else if the gate is an AND gate or a NANO gate then 
for each fanin do 
if its input is represented by a graph then 
create a node with the graph as the decision point 
label the node with the line number 
of the current input 
else 
take the partial BDD for the input 
if this is the first fanin then 
make the node or input BDD the current partial BOD 
else 
set the 1 exits of the current partial BDD to be the 
input BOD 
else if the gate is an OR gate or a NOR gate then 
for each fanin do 
if its input is represented by a graph then 
create a node with the graph as the decision point 
label the node with the line number 
of the current input 
else 
take the partial BOD for the input 
if this is the first fanin then 
make the node or input BDD the current partial BDD 
else 
set the O exits of the current partial BDD 
to be the input BDD 
if the gate is an INVERTER, a NANO or a NOR then 
complement the values of all the constant nodes 
if the gate is a primary input or 
the output of the gate is a fanout stem or 
the output of the gate is observable then 
create a graph the for the constructed BDD and mark 
the gate with the index of the graph 
else 
mark the gate with the index of the entrance node 
of the constructed BDD 
13 
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2.3 Modification to the Conversion Algorithm 
For reasons that will be apparent later, two minor 
modifications to the conversion algorithm allow it to 
produce BDD's that require slightly less overhead for 
fault simulation. First, when the gate network is 
levelized, a gate may be assigned to level L with an 
output that is required only by gates at level L+K or 
higher, where K > 1. If the output of the gate is not 
observabie, then the level of the gate is increased to 
L+K-1. 'If there happens to be an output between levels 
L+K and L+K-2, no overhead will be required for the 
changed gate. For similar reasons, whenever a gate with 
an observable output and a gate with a nonobservable 
output have the same level, the gate with the observable 
output is assigned to a BDD first. 
3 The BOD Fault Simulation Algorithm 
'3.1 Basic Fault Simulation'Algorithm 
14 
Given a BDD network and a set of values for the input 
graphs, the goal of fault simulation is to find the set of 
,. 
critical nodes. A critical node is a variable node such 
that switching the node's input from its left exit to its 
right exit would change the value of an observable graph. 
switching the exits corresponds to provoking a fault in a 
gate network, while changing an observable graph 
corresponds to propagating a fault in a gate network. To 
tell if a node is critical according to the definition of 
a critical node, we could mark the node as stuck and 
resimulate the network. We will take another approach. 
To test if a node is critical, we will replace the node 
with a constant node that has a value complementary to the 
good-simulation value of original node. For the node to 
be critical, two conditions must hold: I) at least one 
observable graph in the new network has a different value, 
and II) the value of the node pointed to by the left exit 
of the original node differs from the value of the node 
pointed to the right exit of the original node. Condition 
I tests if the fault will propagate to an observable 
output if it is provoked, while condition II tests if the 
fault really is provoked. Note that a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for I) to hold is that the node be 
on the active path of its BDD. Clearly changing a node 
not on the active&path of its graph will never change the 
graph so being on the active path is necessary, while 
--
15 
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changing a graph in a BDD network will change nodes in all 
the other graphs that depend on the changed graph but the 
net result of the changes is as unpredictable as changing 
a fanout stem in a gate network, so being on an active 
path is not sufficient. 
The two conditions suggest the algorithm shown • in 
Figure 8. This algorithm examines each node on the active 
path. To test if a node is critical, it cuts the node out 
of the graph and replaces it with a constant node with the 
complement of the value of the node. The altered network 
is then simulated. Note that although the value of the 
graph that contains the node will change, the values of 
other graphs may not. If the value of an observable graph 
changes, the other exit of the current node 
I 1S simulated 
as if it were an entrance node of a graph. If this exit 
has a value different from the exit that was taken during 
I 
the good simulation, the node is marked as critical. 
•· 
16 
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Figure 8. Bas)c Algorithm 
{ EvaluateNode - evaluate the value of a node} 
procedure EvaluateNode(node); 
begin 
if the node has not been evaluated then 
if the node is a constant o node then 
Nodes(node].Value := o 
else if the node is a constant 1 node then 
Nodes[node].Value := 1 
else { if the node is a decision node then} 
EvaluateGraph( Nodes[node].DecisionGraph) 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].DecisionGraph ].Value: 
= O then 
EvaluateNode( Nodes[node].LeftNode) 
Nodes[node].Value := 
Nodes[ Nodes[nodes].LeftNode ].Value 
else 
Evaluate( Nodes[node].RightNode) 
Nodes[node].Value := 
Nodes[ Nodes[node].RightNode ].Value 
end; 
{ EvaluateGraph - evaluate the value of a graph} 
procedure EvaluateGraph(graph); 
begin 
if the graph has not been evaluated then 
EvaluateNode(Graphs[graph].EntranceNode) 
Graphs[graph].Value := 
Nodes[ Graphs[graph].EntranceNode ].Value 
end: 
• 
,, 
m. 
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{ FindCritical - find all critical nodes} 
procedure FindCritical; ~ 
begin 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs ·= 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
for each node do 
end; 
if the node is on an active path then 
{ test for condition I} 
flip the value of the node . 
clear the value of all graphs and all other nodes 
{ the flip and clear effectively replaces the node 
with a constant node with a complemented value} 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. a faulty simulation} 
if the value changes {condition I is met} then 
{ test for condition II} 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
the good simulation 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
mark the node as critical 
3,. 2 Modification I: Saving Good Values 
.u 
Note that when the other exit of a node is evaluated 
while testing for condition II, the simulation can use 
values already computed by the good simulation. 
FindCritical is revised as shown in Figure 9: 
18 
Figure 9. Algorithm after Modification I. 
procedure FindCritical; 
.begin • 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
for each node do 
if the node is on an active path then 
flip the value of the node 
-, 
clear the value of all graphs and all the other nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. a faulty simulation} 
if the value changes {condition I is met} then 
restore good values to all nodes and graphs{*new*} 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
the good simulation 
save good values {***new***} 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
mark the node as critical 
\ 
,3,.:3 Modification II: Critical Graphs 
Observe that for a given graph, either all sensitive 
nodes meet condition I or they all fail condition I. A 
graph is called critical if and only if it has a sensitive , 
node that meets condition I. This means that simulation 
from the observable graphs need only be done once per 
graph instead of once per sensitive node. FindCritical 
may be altered as shown below in Figure 10: 
• 
19 
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Figure 10. Algorithm after Modification II. 
procedure FindCritical; 
begin 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
set Critical to Unknown for each graph {***new***} 
for each node do 
end; 
if the node is on an active path then 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical is 
Unknown then { *new*} 
flip the value of the graph . 
clear the value of all graphs and all other nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. a faulty simulation} 
if an observable graph changed then {**new**} 
set Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical:= Yes 
else 
set Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical := No 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical= Yes then 
{*new*} 
restore good values to all nodes and graphs 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
the good simulation 
save good values 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
mark the node as critical 
3.4 Modification III: Levelized Graphs 
This modification and the following modificati6ns 
require that the graphs and nodes be in a level organized 
' 
form. Level organized form means that nodes in a graph do 
not use any higher graphs as decision var.iables and that 
all the nodes for a graph follow the nodes of all lower 
20 
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graphs. S_ince our conversion algorithm examines the gate 
network in order -by increasing level, the BDD networks it 
produces have their graphs in order by increasing level 
also. The nodes, however, are not always in the proper 
order. The reordering procedure shown in Figure 11 
collects the nodes for each graph. The values in the 
array NodeMap contain the new index for each node. When· 
the conversion program writes out the BDD data structure, 
all it must do is write the value of NodeMap[n] instead of 
n whenever n is a pointer to a node. 
Figure 11. Procedure to Reorder Nodes. 
{ Reorder -
create a mapping to put the nodes in levelized order· .} 
procedure Reorder; 
begin 
i := 0 
for g := 1 to NumberOfGraphs do 
for n := 1 to NumNodes do 
if Node[n].Graph = g then 
i := i + 1 
NodeMap[i] := n 
end; 
Sinca a change in a node in graph I cannot effect 
graph J, (for J less than I), the good values for these 
graphs do not have to be cleared. Thus, FindCritical can 
be revised ~gain as shown in Figure 12. 
21 
Figure 12. Algorithm after Modification III. 
procedure F'indCri ti cal; 
begin 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
set Critical to Unknown for each graph 
for each node do 
if the node is on an active path then 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical is 
Unknown then 
flip the value of the graph 
clear the value and nodes of this graph and 
all higher graphs {***new***} 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. a faulty simulation} 
if an observable graph changed then 
set Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical:= 
else 
Yes 
set Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical:= No 
if Graphs[ Nodes(node].Graph ].Critical= Yes then 
restore good values to all nodes and graphs 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
end; 
the good simulation 
save good values 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
mark the node as critical 
3.5 Modification IV: Change Sets 
.. 
When a given graph changes, decision nodes in other 
graphs may be affected. If no sensitive nodes in the 
affected graph are changed, the value of the graph will 
not be changed. Just as in a gate network, one can 
envision the effects of a fault propagating through the 
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graphs in a BDD network. Instead of blindly simulating 
the entire network to determine if condition I holds for a 
particular fault, we will maintain a list of graphs on the 
propagation frontier. A graph is on the propagation 
frontier if no faulty simulation has been done for it and 
at least one of its nodes uses as its variable a graph 
that was changed due to the fault. Initially, the list 
will be set to contain all graphs with a node that uses 
the graph to be tested as its variable. From then on, the 
lowest level graph in the list is removed from the list 
and simulated. If the faulty value of the graph differs 
from the good value, all graphs with a node that uses the 
just simulated graph as its variable are added to the 
list. This process continues until either 1) a graph that 
is an observable output changes, in which case the 
original graph is critical, or the list is empty, in which 
case the original graph is not critical. As a speed up, 
note that if the the list ever contains exactly one graph 
and that graph changes then the original graph is critical 
if and only if the new graph is critical. This suggests 
that the nodes should be checked from highest to lowest. 
With this in mind, FindCritical can be recoded as shown in 
Figure 13. Note that this process parallels methods used 
to calculate the D-cube c(T,F) for a test T and a fault F 
in gate networks. For example, a proof that the speed up 
is valid is given as Lemma A in [5]. 
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Use of change sets also has the desirable side effect 
that multiple outputs can be traced at once. The only 
differences between tracing from a single output and 
tracing from multiple outputs are that an extra good 
simulation must be done for for each additional output and 
. 
that more graphs are initially labelled critical. Even if 
N outputs share a common graph, that graph will only be 
evaluated once, so the time to simulate all N outputs will 
be much less than N times the amount of time needed to 
simulate the first output. Thus, the extra cost of cost 
of simulating several outputs at once depends more on the 
number of • unique graphs on critical paths from all the 
outputs than on the number of outputs. 
, 
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Figure 13. Algorithm after Modification IV. 
procedure FindCritical; 
.begin 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
set Critical to Yes for each observable graph 
and Unknown for all other graphs {***new***} 
,. 
for each node from highest to lowest do { ***new***} 
if the node is on an active path then 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical is 
Unknown then 
flip the value of the graph 
GraphsToCheck := (all graphs that have a decision 
node that depends on 
Nodes[node].Graph) 
while (GraphsToCheck not empty) and 
) 
(Critical= Unknown) do {***new***} 
g := lowest graph in GraphsToCheck 
remove g from GraphsToCheck 
clear all nodes in graph g 
EvaluateGraph(g) 
if graph g changes then 
if (GraphsToCheck is empty) and 
(Graphs[g].Critical <> Unknown) then 
Critical := Graphs[g].Critical 
else if graph g is observable 
Critical := Yes 
. clear GraphsToCheck 
else . 
GraphsToCheck := GraphsToCheck + 
(all graphs that have a decision node that 
depends on g) 
if Critical= Unknown then Critical := No 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical= Yes then 
restore good values to all nodes and graphs 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
the good simulation 
save good values 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
mark the node as critical ) 
end; .. 
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.3 ,6. Modification V: Graph Jumping 
The previous change reduced the work needed to tell if 
a graph is critical from evaluating most of the graphs 
from the observable output down to evaluating only graphs 
·on the path to the observable output. However, when 
adding graphs to the list, it treats all nodes 
identically. The goal of this modification is to maintain 
information about the types of nodes that have changed in 
a graph. First, note that the graph will not change 
unless at least one sensitive node changes. Thus, we will 
only enter a graph onto the list when a sensitive node on 
that graph is affected. 
Given set of nodes in a graph (including at least one 
sensitive node), we want to tell if the graph's output 
will be changed if the given nodes all use their other 
exit. Suppose exactly one ··node changes on a critical 
graph. Then the graph changes if and only if co_ndition II 
holds for the node, i.e. the node is on the sensitive 
path and the exits of the node have different values. 
Since the graph is critical, all of its nodes were checked 
for meeting condition II as part of the test for 
criticality, so this information is already known and 
requires no extra work to calculate. To generalize this 
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case, note that if the other exit of a node has the same 
value as the graph, the node cannot affect the graph, 
while if the other exit has a different value than the 
graph, the node may affect the graph. For example, if the 
value of the other exit of all the affected nodes is 
identical to the value of the graph, the graph will remain 
unchanged. By the same token, if the graph is on the list 
and if the value of the other exit of all the affected 
nodes differs from the value of the graph, then the graph 
will change. If some mixture of these two types of nodes 
changes, the graph must still be simulated. Sometimes the 
value of the graph or of the other exit of a node is not 
known. In this case, the graph must be simulated also. 
Figure 14 shows the results of this modification. 
Figure 14. Algorithm after Modification v. 
procedure FindCritical; 
begin 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
set Critical to Yes for each observable graph 
and No for all other graphs 
for each node from highest to lowest do 
if the node is on an active path then 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical is 
Unknown then 
clear CriticalCount, NonCriticalCount, and 
Unknowncount values for each graph {*new*} 
flip the value of the graph 
for every decision node that depends on 
Nodes[node].Graph do 
if the node is on an active path then 
add its graph to GraphsToCheck 
if the other exit of the node is unknown or 
the value of the graph is unknown then {new} 
increment Unknowncount for its graph 
else if the other exit differs from the 
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value of the ~raph then {***new***} 
increment CriticalCount for its graph 
else if the other exit is identical to the 
value of then graph then {***new***} 
increment NonCriticalCount for its graph 
while (GraphsToCheck not empty) and 
(Critical= Unknown) do 
g := lowest graph in GraphsToCheck 
remove g from GraphsToCheck 
if CriticalCount[g] = 1 and 
NonCriticalCount[g] = o and 
Unknowncount[g] = o then 
changed:= Yes 
flip Graphs[g].Value 
else if CriticalCount[g] = O and 
· NonCriticalCount[g] = 1 and 
Unknowncount(g] = o then 
changed:= No 
else 
clear all nodes in graph g 
EvaluateGraph(g) 
changed:= (Graphs[g].Value changed) 
if changed then 
if (GraphsToCheck is empty) and 
(Graphs[g].Critical <> Unknown) then 
Critical:= Graphs[g].Critical 
else if graph g is observable 
Critical:= Yes 
clear GraphsToCheck 
else 
for every decision node that depends on 
Nodes[node].Graph do {*new*} 
if the node is on an active path then 
add its graph to GraphsToCheck 
if the other exit of the node is unknown or 
the value of the graph is unknown then 
increment Unknowncount for its graph{new} 
else if the other exit differs from the 
value of the graph then {*new*} 
increment CriticalCount for its graph 
else if the other exit is identical to the 
value of then graph then {*new*} 
increment NonCriticalCount for its graph 
if Critical= Unknown then Critical := No 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical= Yes then 
restore good values to all nodes and graphs 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
the good simulation 
save good values 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
mark the node as critical 
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end; 
:~ •. 7 Modification VI: Stem Approximation 
The previous version of the algorithm does a faulty 
simulation for every graph evaluated during the good 
simulation. Each graph corresponds to a fanout stem in 
the gate network. Abramovici, Menon and Miller (AM&M) [2] 
have discovered that fanout stems are rarely critical if 
1 
none of their branches are critical. They claim that 
the approximation occurs seldom and consists in not 
marking as detected some faults that are actually 
detected in the evaluated set ••.. This 
approximation does not affect the usefulness of the 
method. 
At worst, this approximation is slightly pessimistic about 
the coverage of a test set. Even if a critical stem • 1S 
not marked as critical for one test vector because none of 
its branches are critical, there will usually be another 
test vector with both the ·stem and some of its branches 1 
critical. Thus, when determining the coverage of a test 
set as a whole, this approximation has the desirable 
effect of reducing the number of faulty simulations 
without loosing much accuracy. Figure 15 shows the 
algorithm after this modification. 
' 
Figure 15. Algorithm after Modification VI. 
,, 
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procedure FindCritical; 
begin 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
set Critical to Yes for each observable graph 
and No for all other graphs 
clear list of stems to check {***new***} 
for each node from highest to lowest do 
if the node is on an active path then 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical is 
Unknown then 
if Nodes[node].Graph not in list of 
stems to check then 
Graphs[Nodes[node].Graph].Critical := No {new} 
else 
clear CriticalCount, NonCriticalCount, and 
Unknowncount values for each graph 
flip the value of the graph 
for every decision node that depends on 
Nodes[node].Graph do 
if the node is on an active path then 
add its graph to GraphsToCheck 
if the other exit of the node is unknown or 
the value of the graph is unknown then 
increment Unknowncount for its graph 
else if the other exit differs from the 
value of the graph then 
increment CriticalCount for its graph 
else if the other exit is identical to the 
value of then graph then 
increment NonCriticalCount for its graph 
while (GraphsToCheck not empty) and 
(Critical= Unknown) do 
g := lowest graph in GraphsToCheck 
remove g from·GraphsToCheck 
if CriticalCount[g] = 1 and 
NonCriticalCount[g] = O and 
Unknowncount[g] = o then 
changed:= Yes 
flip Graphs[g].Value 
else if CriticalCount[g] = O and 
NoncriticalCount[g] = 1 and 
Unknowncount[g] = o then 
changed:= No 
else 
clear all nodes in graph g 
EvaluateGraph(g) 
changed -: = ( Graphs [ g] • Value changed) 
if changed then 
if (GraphsToCheck is empty) and 
(Graphs[g].Critical <> Unknown) then 
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Critical:= Graphs[g].Critical 
else if graph g is observable 
Critical := Yes 
. .. clear GraphsToCheck 
else 
for every decision node that depends on 
Nodes[node].Graph do 
if the node is on an active path then 
add its graph to GraphsToCheck 
if the other exit of the node is unknown or 
the value of the graph is unknown then 
increment Unknowncount for its graph 
else if the other exit differs from the 
value of the graph then 
increment CriticalCount for its graph 
else if the other exit is identical to the 
value of then graph then 
increment NonCriticalCount for its graph 
if Critical= Unknown then Critical:= No 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical= Yes then 
restore good values to all nodes and graphs 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
the good simulation 
save good values 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
mark the node as critical 
enter Nodes[node].DecisionGraph in 
list of stems to check { ***new***} 
:3 .• 8 Modification VII: Fault Dropping 
When determining the fault coverage of a set of test 
vectors but the exact coverage of each individual vector 
is not required, we do not have to simulate faults for one 
·test that already have been detected by another test. 
I 
Skipping tl1ese faults is. called fault g.ropping. Since only 
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the remaining faults must be simulated for each vector, 
fault dropping reduces the time spent per vector. Figure 
·· 16 shows the algorithm with fault dropping. In order to 
keep track of which nodes have been tested for which 
faults, we have added a new field in each node that tells 
which faults have been tested and a new procedure 
Initialize that must be called once for each test set 
(while FindCritical is called once for each test 
). 
vector) 
to initialize the new field. Note that the stem 
approximation cannot be made when doing fault dropping 
because stem faults will not be detected unless the stem 
happens to be critical on the first test for at least one 
branch that detects a fault on that branch. 
Figure 16. Algorithm after Modification VII. 
Nodes: array [1 •• MaximumNumberOfNodes] of 
record 
{ same as before plus} 
TestedForstuck: array [O •• l] of 
{ Yes, or No} 
end; 
procedure Initialize; 
begin 
for each node do 
set TestedForStuck[O] to No 
set TestedForStuck[l] to No 
end; 
procedure FindCritical; 
begin 
clear the value of all nodes 
evaluate the observable graphs 
{i.e. do a good simulation} 
set Criti.cal to Yes for each observable graph 
and No for all other graphs 
for each node from highest to lowest do 
if the node is on an active path then 
if TestedForStuck[ Graphs[Nodes[node].Graph].Value] 
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= No then {***new***} 
if Graphs[ Nodes[node].Graph ].Critical is 
Unknown then 
clear CriticalCount, Noncriticalcount, ~nd 
Unknowncount values for each graph 
flip the value of the graph 
for every decision node that depends on 
Nodes[node].Graph do 
if the node is on an active path then 
add its graph to GraphsToCheck 
if the other exit of the node is unknown or 
the value of the graph is unknown then 
increment Unknowncount for its graph 
else if the other exit differs from the 
value of the graph then 
increment CriticalCount for·its graph 
else if the other exit is identical to the 
value of then graph then 
increment NonCriticalCount for its graph 
while (GraphsToCheck not empty) and 
(Critical= Unknown) do 
g := lowest graph in GraphsToCheck 
remove g from GraphsToCheck 
if CriticalCount[g] = 1 and 
NonCriticalCount[g] = o and 
Unknowncount[g] = o then 
changed:= Yes 
flip Graphs[gJ,. Value 
else if CriticalCount[g] = o and 
NonCriticalCount(g] = 1 and 
Unknowncount[g] = o then 
changed:= No 
else 
clear all nodes in graph g 
EvaluateGraph(g) 
changed:= (Graphs(g].Value changed) 
if changed then 
if (GraphsToCheck is empty) and 
(Graphs[g].Critical <> Unknown) then 
Critical:= Graphs[g].Critical 
else if graph g is observable 
Critical:= Yes 
clear GraphsToCheck 
else 
for every decision node that depend~ on 
Nodes(node].Graph do 
if the node is on an .active path then 
add its graph to GraphsToCheck 
if the other exit of the node is unknown or 
the value of the graph is unknown then 
increment Unknowncount for its graph 
. else if the other exit differs from the 
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end; 
value of the graph then 
increment CriticalCount for its graph 
else if the other exit is identical to the 
value of then graph then , 
increment NoncriticalCount for its graph 
if Critical= Unknown then Critical:= No 
if Graphs( Nodes(node].Graph ].Critical= Yes then 
restore good values to all nodes and graphs 
evaluate the exit not taken during 
the good simulation 
save good values 
if it has a different value then 
{condition II is met} 
,, 
mark the node as critical 
if the node's variable= o then {***new***} 
set TestedForStuck[O] = Yes 
else 
set TestedForstuck[l] = Yes 
4 Advantages over Gate Representations 
. I 
4.1 Qualitative Comparison 
This method has several. advantages over fault 
simulation based on gate networks: it can run with or 
without making approximations; it can use fault dropping, 
and it can handle multiple observable outputs in a single 
pass. 
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Fault simulation in gate networks is an 
algorithmically hard problem because faulty simulation is 
needed, either eMplicitly or implicitly, to determine the 
criticality of stems. If the proportion of stems to gates 
is constant for a given class of networks, then doubling 
the size of the network would double the number of stems, 
which would double the number of faulty simulations 
required. If the time required per simulation is 
proportional to the number of gates, the time to do the 
total simulation would increase by four. An algorithm 
that increased in time this fast would run too slowly on 
large networks to be useful for things such as grading 
test sets. Conventional gate oriented algorithms rely on 
making approximations or fault dropping in order to handle 
large networks. For example, the AM&M algorithm [2] may 
miss detecting a critical stem if it has no critical 
branches. The BDD algorithm can run in reasonable time 
without approximations. In this mode, it will never miss 
,.,, 
a critical node or label a noncritical node as critical. 
When it is allowed to make approximations, it runs between 
3% and 5% faster, depending on the topology of the 
network. 
Some algorithms for fault simulation on gate networks 
cannot use fault dropping. To reduce the amount of 
simulation for each test vector, they 
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criticality of all stems with a level higher than L be 
known before attempting to determi~e the criticality of a 
stem at level L. The BDD algorithm exploits criticality 
information when it is present, but does not require it. 
Thus, the algorithm inherently compensates for missing 
information due to fault dropping • 
Gate-based fault simulation can only handle one 
observable output at a time. A normal circuit may have a 
large number of outputs. Fault-simulation algorithms on 
gate networks usually trace from each output to the 
primary inputs, one output at a time. On every BDD 
network tested so far, tracing all the outputs at once 
took only slightly longer than tracing a single output. 
Thus, on classes of circuits that have a fixed proportion 
of observable outputs to gates, such as some iterative 
circuits, an algorithm that can trace all the outputs in 
one pass will run an order of magnitude faster than an 
algorithm that must trace each output one at a time. 
·4 ..• 2· Experiments 
..... ~ 
The BOD fault simulation algorithm outlined above, a 
simplified • version of the AM&M critical path tracing 
36 
.. 
algorithm [2] and. a gate-network-to-BOP conversion 
algorithm were coded in VAX-Pascal on a VAX-11/750 under 
VMS V4.l. Each program was run on two classes of networks 
and the 74Sl81 ALU, and run-time statistics were collected 
that show the relative time complexity of each algorithm. 
All networks were entered in gate network form and then 
converted to BDD's. 
Modified versions of the published programs AUGMENT 
and ANALYZE were used to. get timings of the programs. 
AUGMENT reads a Pascal program and inserts calls to timing 
procedures at the beginning and end of each subroutine. 
As the program runs, the timing procedures collect timing 
data. When the program finishes, it writes a file 
containing the timing information. ANALYZE reads the 
timing information and a symbol table created by AUGMENT 
to produce a report showing the number of times each 
procedure was called, the percentage of the calls to the 
total number of procedure calls, the average number of 
milliseconds per call (not counting calls made to other 
procedures), total number of milliseconds and percentage 
of the total run time, the average number of milliseconds 
per call (including calls.made to other procedures), total 
number of milliseconds and the percentage of the total run 
time. The ~eport can be sorted in forward or reverse 
order by procedure name or by any of the columns. The 
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last line of the report shows the total run time in 
seconds and the total number of procedure calls. A report 
from a single run shows where the program spends its time. 
It shows which procedures would improve the performance 
the most it they were optimized. A report from several 
runs on similar, but increasingly larger, inputs showe 
where the algorithm encoded by the program should be 
optimized. 
The first network simulated was the Signetics 74Sl81 
4·-bit ALU. /It had 14 primary inputs, 8 outputs and 87 
gates. Exclusive-or gates were replaced with four NANO 
gates. This circuit was chosen because it is well-known 
and has been analyzed by other methods. 
The exclus·ive-or trees were generated by a program. 
For a given number of levels, N, the program generates a 
tree with 2 ** N inputs, 1 output, and 4 * (2 ** N - 1) 
NANO gates. This circuit form was chosen because its 
large amount of reconvergent fanout typically gives worst 
cases for fault-simulation in gate networks. The 
corresponding BDD should also be a worst case for BDD 
fault simulation. 
The adders were also generated by a program. For a 
given number of cells, N, the program would generate an 
38 
\ 
· adder with 2N + 1 inputs, N + 1 outputs and N cells. Each 
cell is a 1-bit full adder implemented in two-level form. 
This circuit was chosen because it has a large number of 
outputs and it has several logic levels for each cell due, 
to the carry ripple. Large adders test the ability of a 
fault simulator to handle a large number of outputs and to 
propagate faults through~many levels of logic. 
4 .,~ .1 The XOR Tree 
The BDD algorithm may not be as efficient as AM&M [2] 
for this network. Trees were tested with up to 7 levels 
and 128 inputs. Although the number of procedure calls in 
the BOD fault simulator increases with an order of 1.02 
(i.e. almost linearly) with respect to the number of 
nodes as the number of levels is increased from 5 to 7, 
the total time spent simulating increases with an order of 
1.8. The total time spent by AM&M increases with an order 
of about 1. 65. 
4. 2' •. 2 The Adder 
:3 .. e·. 
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From a network with 5 cells to a network with 50 
cells, the total time increases with an order of 1.49 for 
the BDD, algorithm and 1.48 for AM&M. When the BDD 
algorithm was run with fault dropping and allowed to trace 
all outputs at once, its total time only increased with an 
order of 1.40 and its time per input vector decreased by a 
factor of 4. With the stem approximation enabled (in 
addition to fault dropping and multiple output tracing), 
the total time increased with an order of 1.26 with a loss 
in precision of about 2.6% of the critical nodes not 
marked as critical. 
4.2.3 Results 
The Tables below show typical timings for the tested 
networks. The times are all in real-time seconds spent 
determining which lines are critical; times for start-up, 
termination, and printing output are not included. The 
BDD fault simulator was run with fault dropping and 
multiple output tracing enabled. Table 1 shows run times 
comparing the BOD fault simulator to a simple 
implementation of the AM&M gate-network critical-path 
tracer. 
40 
,(\ 
The gate network path tracer implemented the 'basic 
algorithm' of [2], but not equal parity cover lines, FFR 
jumping, •no overlap' mode or start and stop lines1 
however, they claim that stem analysis requires 50 percent 
of their total run time and that using equa·l. parity cover 
lines reduces stem analysis time by 10 percent and FFR 
jumping reduces it by another 10 percent. They also claim 
that 'no overlap' mode reduces run time by about 20 
percent. 
spent 
We also suspect that some of the additional time 
. ,{ h id t th by the critical pat tracer s ue o e 
implementation, not the algorithm. For example, frontiers 
were implemented as sets, so operations of the form 
i = lowest level gate in Frontier 
were implemented as loops. AM&M do not tell how they 
implement frontiers, but it is conceivable that 
implementing frontiers as several linked lists of gates, 
with one list for each level and with each list ordered by 
gate number would reduce the run time, so that the 
apparent order-of-magnitude advantage of the BOD algorithm 
is perhaps exaggerated. 
Even though our algorithm seems to increase in time 
slightly faster than the AM&M critical path tracer, 
critical path tracing cannot handle multiple outputs or 
fault dropping. on the other hand, the BDD algorithm can 
use fault dropping and can trace from multiple outputs 
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with little extra cost. .  ' 
' 
Table 1. BDD Simulation Time vs. Gate Network Tracing Time 
Circuit· 
------------------32 input XOR tree 
64 input XOR tree 
128 input XOR tree 
5 cell ADDER 
50 cell ADDER 
74SN181 4-bit ALU 
BDD Time 
--------
537 
1830 
6730 
420 
14780 
870 
Gate Network Time 
-----------------4570 
13390 
44643 
5910 
180430 
28920 
Table 2 shows the effects that different modifications 
have on the algorithm. The results show that graph 
jumping reduces the number of node evaluations by at least 
an order of magnitude. Tracing all the outputs at once 
reduces the number of node evaluations by a factor that 
depends on the number of outputs and the number of graphs 
that ar~ used by more than one output. With graph jumping 
enabled, fault dropping reduced the number of node 
evaluations by half. Fault dropping had more effect on 
the adder because the test set was longer and most faults 
were detected by the first few tests. The approximation 
algorithm reduced the number of node evaluations from 2 to 
5 percent. Since the approximation cannot be used when 
using fault dropping, it should only be used when complete 
fault lists are required for each test. 
r· 
... / 
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Table 2. Effect on BDD Algorithm of Different Options 
Circuit G 0 D A Node Evaluations 
------------------
--- --- --- ---
----------------32 input, single N - N - 459 051 
output parity y - N' .N 5 136 
tree y - ·N y 5 136 
all 436 faults y - y - 3 786 
detected 
50 cell adder N - N - 2 344 689 
2232 of 2302 faults N - y - 398 703 
detected by a set y N N N 217 629 
of 20 random test y N N y 212 677 
vectors y N y - 149 422 
y y N N 48 411 
y y N y 46 707 
y y y 
-
22 775 
G = Graph jumping enabled o = All outputs traced at once 
D = Fault dropping enabled A= Approximation enabled 
4.3 Comparisons with Other Methods 
Most timings reported in the literature are times to 
calculate test sets. Some test-set generation programs 
create test sets by selecting an untested fault and then 
attempting to find a test for it. Once a test is found, 
the programs runs a fault simulator to determine other 
faults detected by that test. The process is repeated 
until a suitable number of faults have been tested. Thus, 
the time to generate a test set of N vectors for a given 
circuit is at least an upper bound on a reasonable time 
that a fault simulator could spend on those same N 
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vectors. On a single run for a circuit with 50 logic 
blocks, Roth et al. -[5] report a time of 45 seconds in 
DALG-II deriving tests and 30 seconds in TEST-DETECT doing 
fault simulation. Wang [6] claims his algorithm runs 
about twice as fast as Roth's. our algorithm can simulate 
a test set of 20 vectors with a coverage of about 97% on a 
50 cell adder with about 600 logic blocks in 31 seconds, 
so we can do several times the work in about the same 
amount of time. Cha et al. [7], however, claim to have 
generated 864 patterns for a 32-bit adder in 422 seconds 
on an IBM 370-168, or about 2 patterns per second. They 
do not say if they combine several patterns into each test 
vector. On the 50 cell adder, we can simulate 2 vectors 
in about 3 seconds. Accounting for the difference between 
50 and 32, we are slightly slower if each pattern is a 
complete test ·vector, or several times faster if they 
combine patterns. In addition, their IBM· mainframe is 
probably faster than our VAX. 
More recently, Waicukauski et al. (8] claim to have 
simulated 50,000 patterns on an 890 gate network in 3.2 
seconds on an IBM 3033, or about 72 nsec/gate-pattern. We 
require about 2.5 msec/gate-pattern, a factor of 30,000 
times longer. However, it would be fairly straight 
forward to modify our algorithm to trace 256 vectors at a 
time as they do. This wc1uld speed up our· algorithm by · a 
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factor of 100, but if it does not, going to 512 or 1024 
vectors should. Also, their IBM 3033 is at least 10 times 
as fast as our VAX-11/750. This leaves a factor of 30 
remaining. The current implementation is entirely in, 
Pascal and contains extra instructions for counting calls 
to different procedures and for disabling certain features 
in order to produce information that was ~seful when 
modifying the algorithm. Rewriting the critical 
procedures in assembly language and deleting the extra 
instructions should make the program run at 1·east twice as 
fast, leaving us only about 10 times slower. We expect to 
start work on these modifications in the near future • 
5 Differences from Other Works 
Although Akers [l] first • using for BDD's suggested 
testing, he used diagrams that matched the gate network at 
a functional level only. According to Akers, a test set 
that fully I exercises all of the nodes and branches of a 
diagram would be useful in testing almost any reasonable 
implementation of its function. Villar and Bracho [3] use 
a modified BDD that they call an atomic digraph; however, 
they mainly use the digraph to assist in calculating the 
ring sum ofDthe good function with a faulty function to 
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derive 'test vectors. The distinguishing features of our 
BDD fault simulation algorithm·· are that 1) the BDD is 
related to the original network in such a way that faults 
' 
in the BDD can be mapped back to the network and 2) faulty 
simulation is not required for each node. 
6-: Conclusions 
A new algorithm was given for fault simulation on 
binary decision diagrams. The algorithm can trace from 
several outputs in one pass at little extra cost per 
output, can use fault dropping, and can make stem 
approximations when not using fault dropping. For one 
test vector on a circuit with one output the algorithm has 
approximately the same computational complexity as fault 
simulation algorithms based on gate-network tracing. When 
performing fault dropping and handling multiple observable 
outputs ir1 a single pass, the algorithm has a considerable 
advantage over gate-based path tracing. 
' 
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